tributions for the variables considered to be stochastic in nature are estimated and inThis study examines the effects of alter-cuded in the model. Pseudorandm nunative government farm programs and hypothetical price variability levels on two Texas bers are drawn and used with the estimated cotton farms which were simulated stochast-probability density functions (pdfs) to deically over a 10-year period. Results indicate velop random values for the variables conthat a combination of high price variability sidered to be stochastic in nature. When the and participation in government programs model is iterated many times, the range of stimulates growth and wealth accumulation. possible outcomes for a specific situation can be estimated and compared with the possible Key words: farm programs, price variability, outcomes of alternative situations.
farm policy simulation results to the assumed grams and the national level of participation pdf of crop prices, it should provide a general influence the distribution of market price indication of the importance of the assump- (Gardner; Lin et al.; Meyers and Ryan; Salathe tions concerning these pdfs. It is hypothe-et al.), these aggregate effects are beyond the sized that farm growth and survival differ not scope of this study. It is assumed that price only when different levels of farm program variability caused by changes in the farm participation are assumed but also under dif-program over the period of the data are capferent levels of price variability. If this is the tured in the historical covariance matrix. case, policy makers should be concerned with Although the CCC program involves both the effects of farm policy on price variability a support price and a release price, their and policy analysts should use a range of relative positions with respect to the market price variability levels rather than relying price have been such that, in spite of gensolely on historical pdfs.
erally favorable market conditions throughout the late 1970's, the release price for BACKGROUND cotton has not been triggered since 1974. It Since its initiation in 1938, the Commodity should also be remembered that the release Credit Corporation (CCC) loan program has price is not a legislated price ceiling. When been one of the fundamental institutions of market price exceeds the release price, govUnited States farm policy for cotton. This ernment owned stocks, if available, are reprogram provides a support price (loan rate), leased from storage. If insufficient stocks are or guaranteed minimum price, to cotton owned by the government to satisfy demand farmers who participate in the farm program. at the release price, market price will remain If the market price is below the loan rate, above the release price. In no year from 1972 the government provides a nonrecourse loan to 1981 were government owned stocks to producers. If the farmer does not redeem greater than 500 bales. For these reasons, the the loan within 9 months, the stocks are effect of the loan program should be to inturned over to the government. Government crease the mean of the farm-level price disowned stocks are released when the market tribution. price is above a designated "release price,"
Because of the nature of the CCC and target which is usually some function of the loan price programs, it is hypothesized that inrate, such as 140 percent.
creased price variability will result in higher During the 1960's, the loan rate for cotton average incomes for farm program particiwas frequently high relative to world market pants. With increased price variability, the prices and, thus, government stocks accu-probability of receiving very high prices inmulated. The target price (deficiency pay-creases. Athough the probability of very low ment) program was designed to provide market prices also increases, the loan and income support to producers without inter-target price program protects producers from fering with the market price. The target price the downside risk. Because the probability is set by legislation and traditionally has been of some very "good" years increases, it is tied loosely to the cost of production. Par-likely that the combination of high price ticipating producers receive a deficiency pay-variability and participation in the farm proment equal to the difference between the gram would stimulate expansion as sufficient target price and the higher of loan rate or cash would be available in some years to season average market price. Total deficiency finance downpayments on machinery and payments to any one producer are limited to land. It is uncertain, a priori, if the proba-$50,000.
bility of bankruptcy will increase as price At the individual farm level, the loan rate variability increases. This will depend, to a and the target price program affects the dis-large degree, on the level of protection ofpersion of price and income respectively by fered by participation in the farm program. truncating the lower tails of the distributions, leading to higher means and smaller vari-METHODOLOGY ances. As the dispersion of the distribution Two different cotton farms in the Texas increases, more of the lower tail is truncated Southern High Plains were simulated assumby the farm programs. The effects of trun-ing three farm program participation possication are therefore increased as price and bilities and five different price variability income variability increase. Although both assumptions. A whole-farm simulation model, the specific provisions of government pro-FLIPSIM V1, was used to evaluate the impacts of selected farm programs and different prob- Table 1 . Annual cotton and dryland cotton yield was multiplied by lint prices for the period were obtained by .4 because only the standard deviation for randomly drawing one price from the daily price was altered. Five different price variJanuary prices reported for the Lubbock cash ability levels were used in this study. Price cotton market for each of the years 1971 to variability level I involved a 60 percent re-1982 (USDA).2 A similar approach was used duction in the standard deviation for prices to obtain cottonseed prices for this time pe-and level II represented a 40 percent reducriod. (Average annual prices and county av-tion in these standard deviations. Price varerage yields were not used because averaging iability level III was the historical base. Price would result in a downward bias in the es-variability levels IV and V involved increases timate of the variability faced by individual in the standard deviation for the price variproducers.) The prices used in the study are ablesof 40 percent and 60 percent, respecalso reported in Table 1 . The base covariance tively. matrix was developed from deviations about the means. No statistically significant trend ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TESTED was found in yields during this period so no detrending procedure was applied. Although
The alternative farm program scenarios this was generally an inflationary period, the analyzed include: (a) full participation in prices were not deflated because it was be-the 1981 provisions of the 1981 Farm Bill lieved that producers often perceive varia-including the target price (70.9 cents/ bility in nominal, not real, terms and the pound), loan rate (52.5 cents/pound), and prices were not moving in a consistently all-risk crop insurance (BASIC); (b) particiupwards direction. Because the objective of pation in the loan program and crop-insurthis study is to test the sensitivity of farm ance (NOTAR); and (c) participation in crop growth and survival to different levels of insurance only (NOSUPP). price variability, little would be gained by A supply control mechanism, such as setdeflating prices.
aside, was not included in the analyses for Four hypothetical probability distributions two reasons. First, no supply control provifor prices and yields were developed from sion was in effect during the 1981 crop year. the base covariance matrix. Standard devia-More importantly, inclusion of a supply contions of prices in the base covariance matrix trol measure would make the results of the were scaled up and down over the range of three policy options difficult to compare. A plus or minus 60 percent, but the same set supply control program links participation of means was used for all five of the pdfs. in the price and income protection provisions of the farm program to a reduction in acreage cotton. Larger farms also had lower cash profor the program commodities, but acreage duction costs because of the ability to take reduction is generally not required for par-advantage of volume discounts. In addition, ticipation in crop-insurance. In the NOSUPP larger farms are able to use machinery more trial, therefore, overall cotton production efficiently, leading to lower per acre mawould be higher than in the other trials be-chinery costs. cause there would be no requirement to reDifferences in financial characteristics, offduce acreage. Higher production would farm income, and living expenses associated exacerbate the effects of changes in price with the different farm sizes were also recvariability on income variability, making the ognized in the typical farm specifications. NOSUPP scenario difficult to compare with Table 2 provides a summary of selected dethe others. mographic and financial characteristics for the two typical farms used in the simulation TYPICAL FARMS model. It should be noted that the leverage Twvo typical cotton farm situations in the ratio is nearly twice as large for the 1,088-Texas Southern High Plains were developed acre farm as for the 511-acre farm. The relfrom producer survey data obtained by Smith. atively high debt load on the larger farm The two farms selected for the present study would be expected to increase the farm's represent a part-time family farm in the re-vulnerability to bankruptcy. gion (511 acres) and a full-time commercial Assumptions about the farms in Table 2 are farm in the region (1,088 acres). The survey held constant across all policy and price vardata describe the typical characteristics of iability options simulated. Further informa-511 and 1,088 acre farms in the region in-tion about the farms used in this analysis can cluding volume of cotton produced, pro-be found in Smith. duction practices, machinery complements, financial position, input purchases, market-SIMULATION MODEL ing experience, and family living expenses.
The typical farms include recognition of FLIPSIM V is a firm level, recursive, Monte economies experienced by different size Carlo simulation model which simulates anfarms. The typical farm specifications reflect nual production, farm policy, marketing, farm the differences in input costs associated with management, and income tax aspects of a size, the cost advantages associated with typ-farm. The different size farms in this study ical levels of vertical integration, and the were simulated over a 10-year planning homarketing price advantages associated with rizon which was replicated 503 times for each each size category. Smith found that the larger farm-size/farm-program/price-variability comfarms generally realized higher prices due to bination. their ability to market cotton in large lots
In the FLIPSIM V model, the analyst may and that large-scale producers had more eco-select one of three options for determining nomic incentive to invest time in marketing the crop-mix. In this study, the farm's crop- mix of irrigated and dryland cotton was pre-for all simulation trials are affected in the determined based on the proportion of the same manner so comparisons of the alterfarm that had historically been irrigated. The native policy participation options are not constant crop-mix option was selected be-invalidated by this assumption. cause it is the simplest. The analysis was also Equipment purchased prior to 1981 is derun using the linear programming option; preciated using a 5 to 7 year life and the however, little change was noted.
double declining balance method. EquipThe analysis was done using nominal dol-ment purchased after 1980 is cost recovered lars to reflect actual costs of capital and the assuming a 5-year life and accelerated cost anticipated investment potentials for farmers. recovery rules. Equipment which passes its Base production and harvesting costs ob-economic life (7 to 10 years) is replaced by tained from the producer surveys were in-trading it for a new replacement. The cost creased at 5 percent annually over the of replacement equipment is assumed to inplanning horizon to account for inflation. 4 crease 5 percent per year (the inflation rate) The model simulates cash production costs from its base price. First year expensing and by multiplying the inflation adjusted per acre maximum investment tax credit are calcuinput costs by planted acreages for the reated for new equipment spective crops. Labor costs are calculated as Cash receipts for each crop are the product Cash receipts for each crop are the product the sum of full-time labor charges plus the, a of random yield, harvested acres, fraction of cost of part-time labor. Harvesting costs are crop marketed, and random price, less the the product of the inflation-adjusted per unit landlords share o e landlord's share of each crop. When the marharvesting cost, yield, 5 and harvested acreage. Average annual crop prices were inflated ket price is less than the effective loan rate 4 percent per year. Infation of prices re-for a crop, the operator's share of the cotton 4 percent per year. Inflation of prices received at a slightly lower rate than costs crop is placed in the CCC loan rather than ceived at alihtyowrattbeing sold if the operator is assumed to parreflects a trend that has been observed over bi if the operator is assumed to parthe period that the joint pdf of prices and ticipate in the program. Stocks are redeemed yields was developed. This assumption is con-from the CCC loan if the market price in the sistent with Tweeten's estimate that farmers following year exceeds the net loan rate are able to pass on only about 72 percent of Deficiency payments are paid when the avincreased production costs. This assumption erage price is less than the target price. The may not be valid for the future; however, deficiency payment is a function of the payresults for the simulation trials are all affected ment rate, farm program yield, harvested (or in the same manner so comparisons of the base) acreage, and national allocation factor alternative policy participation options re-(0.90). main valid.
The 1982 insurance rates for the Federal The model amortizes all outstanding loans Crop Insurance program in the study area are as simple interest mortgages. (Annual interest used for both representative farms. It is asrates for existing land, machinery, and op-sumed that the farm operators elect the 65 erating loans were, respectively, 8.5, 13, and percent yield coverage level and the high 15 percent.) The market value of farm ma-price guarantee. This level of coverage is chinery and cropland is updated, assuming representative of the study area and is conthe value of land increases 5 percent per year sistent with other research for the region and the nominal value of used equipment (Lemieux et al.) . Provisions to increase or decreases 1 percent per year. The upward decrease the annual insurance premium based adjustment of land values to keep pace with on loss records are incorporated into the inflation may not reflect the current situation model. in the study area, but is consistent with the After simulating the farm policies selected longrun trend over the data period. As with by the user, the model determines the farm the assumptions regarding inflation, results operator's year-endfinancial position and cal40ver the 1980-1983 period, the Consumer Price Index rose from 246.8 to 298.4 (1967=100) which is consistent with an average annual inflation rate of approximately 5 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce).
sAverage annual yields were held constant over the planning horizon because there was no discernible trend in yields in the study region over the time horizon of the data.
culates family cash withdrawals 6 and accrued Selection of a different discount rate would income taxes. Year-end cash flow deficits are not have changed the ranking of results, only handled as follows: (a) grant a lien on crops the magnitude of PVENW. The probability of in storage, (b) refinance long-term equity, survival is the number of iterations the farm (c) refinance intermediate-term equity, (d) remains solvent divided by the total number and/or sell cropland. 7 If the operator is un-of iterations (50). able to cover the deficit, the farm is declared insolvent and the model begins the next it-RESULTS eration. A farm may also be declared insolvent if its debt-to-equity ratio exceeds the maxi-
The simulation results for the 511-acre and mum established by lenders in the local area 1,088-acre farms are presented in tables 3 (2.33). and 4, respectively. For both farms under all Personal income taxes and social security price variability/policy participation comtaxes are calculated for the operator who is binations, both the average present value of assumed to be married and filing a joint in-ending net worth PVENW and the average come tax return with four personal exemp-ending acres operated are greater than their tions. The regular income tax liability is beginning values, but the amount of increase computed using two methods: income av-is different in each case. eraging (if qualified) and the standard tax
The 511-acre farm exhibits the strongest tables. The model selects the tax strategy tendency to grow in terms of both financial which results in the lower income tax lia-assets and acreage operated under a combibility.
nation of high price variability and full parThe farm is permitted to grow each year ticipation in the farm program (BASIC option). by purchasing cropland if the operator has For the 511-acre farm under the BASIC opsufficient cash to cover the 30 percent down tion, average ending acreage operated inpayment plus additional machinery necessary creases from 655 acres under the lowest level for the proposed larger farm. The operator of price variability to 805 acres under the is permitted to borrow against equity in land highest level of price variability. Similarly, to meet up to 50 percent of the down pay-the average present value of ending net worth ment. The farm operation can also grow by is $283,700 under the BASIC option with leasing land if the operator can meet the low price variability and $345,800 when downpayment requirements for purchasing price variability is high. This indicates that, additional machinery needed by the pro-as hypothesized, farm program provisions inposed large size farm. If machinery is pur-teract with high price variability to create a chased due to growth, it is depreciated and climate favorable to farm growth. the operator's income taxes are recalculated.
For the 511-acre farm under the BASIC Probability of survival, average present option, the probability of survival does not value of ending net worth, and average end-appear to be affected by the level of price ing farm size are the three criteria for eval-variability but remains a constant 98 percent, uating the firm level impacts of alternative indicating that when full participation in the farm programs and price variability levels. farm program is elected, increased price varThe average present value of ending net worth iability does not result in an increased risk (PVENW) is the farm operator's average end-of insolvency for farms with these characing net worth discounted to the first year of teristics. the planning horizon using a discount rate Under the NOTAR option, the operator is of 5 percent. The 5 percent figure was se-assumed to participate in the loan and crop lected because 5 percent interest is generally insurance program, but receives no defiavailable on passbook accounts in the area. ciency payment. Loss of the deficiency pay-6 Limits on annual cash withdrawals were established at $15,000 (lower limit) and $40,000 (upper limit). Within these limits, family living expenses were based on the following consumption function: Withdrawals = 15, 200) ; where disposable income is total cash farm income minus accrued federal and self employment taxes and the value of straight line depreciation for all machinery on the farm which was scheduled for replacement at the end of its economic life. The marginal propensity to consume is based on work reported by Richardson and Nixon. It is the mode of a variety of estimated marginal propensities to consume for U.S. farm families. As with other assumptions in this study, the choice of marginal propensity to consume is consistent in all trials and therefore will not affect the major conclusions of this study. bThe probability of survival identified in this study is the probability that the farm will maintain its equity ratios at levels established by local financial institutions, i.e. a debt-to-equity ratio of less than 2.33. This is the average over 50 iterations of the present value of ending net worth. Initial net worth for the farm was $166,900. The ending net worth for the farm was discounted using a 5 percent after tax discount rate.
ments is hypothesized to reduce producer financial position does not benefit from inincome, resulting in a reduced capacity for creased price variability. On the 511-acre expansion. It is also hypothesized that the farm, the highest PVENW occurs at the lowest producer under NOTAR would be exposed level of price variability. This indicates that to more downside risk from increases in price it is the combination of farm program supvariability thus increasing the probability of ports and high price variability that stimuinsolvency.
lates growth and not just increased variability Results for the 5 -acre farm support th alon. For the 51 -acree farm under NOTAR, first hypothesis, but not the second. Under average ending acreage rises only slightly as NOTAR, the PVENW and ending acres oper-variability increases. This very slight level of ated are less than under BASIC at every level increase was due to occasional "good" years of price variability. However, the same trend providing the necessary cash flow for land across price variability is present with av-expansion. However, the decrease in ending erage PVENW and acres operated increasing net worth as variability increases demonsteadily from $263,900 and 597 acres, re-strates that the stimulus for overall growth spectively, at the lowest level of price var-is missing without the price and income supiability to $304,000 and 655 acres at the port programs. highest level of price variability. Under the Under the NOSUPP option, the probability NOTAR option, growth appears to be stim-of survival for the 511-acre farm does not ulated by high price variability, but not to appear to be affected by the level of price as great an extent as under the BASIC option. variability. This result is most likely caused Under the NOTAR option, the probability by the initial financial strength of the farm of survival varies from 96 percent (price and the high level of off-farm income. Again, variability level V) to 100 percent (price minor variations in the probability of survival variability levels II and III). There is no trend are caused by random elements in the model. across price variability levels and the slight The 1,088-acre farm begins at a much more changes are explained by the random com-vulnerable financial position. The initial leponents of the model. Because the proba-verage ratio is .82 as compared to .44 for bility of survival remains high, this farm the 511-acre farm. The farm family is also appears well protected from insolvency no assumed to have a lower level of off-farm matter what the level of variability in price. income, $16,000 as compared to $21,000. The characteristics of this farm, given in Ta-These characteristics, representative of comble 2, explain these results. The 511-acre mercial-size farms in the area, are hypothefarm has high off-farm income and a strong sized to make this farm much more vulnerable initial financial position, making it relatively to the down-side risks of increased variability. invulnerable to insolvency.
It is expected a priori that the probability The final policy alternative, NOSUPP, in-of survival for this farm will decrease as price volves participation in only the crop insur-variability increases in the NOSUPP option ance program. Under NOSUPP, unlike BASIC and possibly in the NOTAR and BASIC options or NOTAR, the farm operator's average ending as well. "The probability of survival identified in this study is the probability that the farm will maintain its equity ratios at levels established by local financial institutions, i.e. a debt-to-equity ratio of less than 2.33. cThis is the average over 50 iterations of the present value of ending net worth. Initial net worth for the farm was $166,900. The ending net worth for the farm was discounted using a 5 percent after tax discount rate.
Results for the 1,088-acre farm are similar of survival are mixed. A reduction in price to those for the r 51 -acre farm in terms of variability below the historic base (level III) PVENW and ending acreage operated, but, as appears to result in an increased probability hypothesized, there is a difference in terms of survival, but an increase in price variability of probability of survival under the NOTAR beyond the base does not appear to have an and NOSUPP options, Table 4 . Under the adverse effect because the CCC loan program BASIC option for the 1,088-acre farm, PVENW protects producers from low prices. increases with price variabilityfrom $383,200
In the final policy option, NOSUPP, the at the lowest level of price variability to probability of survival for the 1,088-acre farm $522,300 at the highest level of price vari-is affected by an increase in variability, dropability. Similarly, average ending acreage in-ping from 88 percent at the lowest level of creases from 1,229 acres at price variability price variability to 58 percent at the highest. level I to 1,373 acres at price variability level This indicates that, without price and income V. On this farm, as well as on the 511-acre supports from the farm program, a farm that farm, a combination of high price variability has a moderate to high debt exposure is more and participation in the farm program stim-vulnerable to insolvency under highly variulates growth. able prices. Under the BASIC option, the probability of Under NOSUPP, the 1,088-acre farm besurvival does not appear to be affected by haves similarly to the 511-acre farm in terms the level of price variability. There is vari-of PVENW and ending acres operated. High ation in the results, but the variation is not price variability alone does not appear to a consistent trend and is explained by random stimulate growth. The PVENW declines steadprocesses in the model. For both cotton farms ily with price variability from $304,700 at tested in this study, it appears that a com-the lowest level of price variability to bination of full participation in the farm pro-$245,700 at the highest level. Average endgram and high price variability (level V) ing acreage increases slightly as price varistimulates financial and physical expansion ability increases, but the overall financial of the farm firm without resulting in an in-strength of the farm declines. creased likelihood of firm failure.
Previous work in the study area by Smith For the 1,088-ace farm under the NOTAR et al. indicate that, under historical price option, PVENW and average ending acreage variability, participation in the farm program increase with price variability from $309,100 stimulates physical and financial growth. This and 1,181 acres, respectively, at the lowest study extends these results. Participation in level of price variability to $387,500 and the farm program results in higher PVENW 1,293 acres at the highest level of price and average ending acres operated regardless variability. Under this option, expansion con-of the level of price variability. For example, tinues to be stimulated by high price varia-at the historical level of price variability (level bility but not to as great an extent as under III) average ending acreage for the 1,088-the BASIC option. Results for the probability acre farm is 1,331 acres under BASIC com-pared to 1,203 acres under NOSUPP, Table der the BASIC and NOTAR scenarios, both 4. Similarly, at price variability level I, av-farms experience increased financial and erage ending acreage operated for the 1,088-physical growth when price variability inacre farm is 1,229 under BASIC and only creases. For the 511-acre farm, the proba-1,174 under NOSUPP. This indicates that farm bility of survival is not affected by price program participation plays a major role in variability when the operator does not parfarm growth regardless of the level of market ticipate in the target price program (NOTAR). price variability.
On the other hand, the probability of survival Smith et al. hypothesized that increased for the 1,088-acre farm under NOTAR inprice variability would result in a wider spread creases somewhat when price variability drops for ending farm size under the different pol-below the historical level. icy participation scenarios. Results from this
Without an income and price support prostudy support this hypothesis. For both farms, gram, financial and physical growth is rethe greatest difference in ending farm size duced for both farms at all levels of price between the NOSUPP and BASIC trials occurs variability. As price variability increases, at price variability level V. Thus, results from present value of ending net worth decreases this study indicate that farm-level policy sim-steadily for both farms. The probability of ulations are sensitive to the assumed level of survival for the 511 -acre farm remains high price variability, for all levels of price variability despite the absence of price and income supports. How-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ever, the probability of survival for the 1,088-acre farm decreases steadily as price variaThe objective of this study was to assess bility increases. The 511-acre farm remains the effects of alternative levels of price var-relatively invulnerable to insolvency due to iability on farm growth and survival for a a strong initial financial position and relaselect set of farm program options. Two dif-tively high off-farm income, characteristics ferent cotton farms in the Texas Southern of farms of this size in the study area. By High Plains were simulated stochastically over contrast, the 1,088-acre farm is characterized a 10-year period, under 5 alternative levels as having a higher debt exposure and lower of price variability and 3 farm policy options. off-farm income. The farms represented a family-size part-time
Results from this study have implications operation in the study area (511 acres be-for the current policy environment. Programs ginning size) and a full-time commercial-size that protect producers from downside price farm in the study area (1,088 acres beginning and income risks appear to stimulate growth, size). Alternative levels of price variability particularly when markets are volatile. For were developed by scaling the historical the two farms in this study, both physical standard deviations for the price variables and financial growth appear most stimulated over a range of plus or minus 60 percent by a combination of full participation in the and using these scaled standard deviations to farm program and high levels of price varidevelop alternative multivariate pdfs. Farm ability. Although the study area was limited policy options included participation in the to the Texas Southern High Plains, it is probloan program, the target price program, and able that the trends observed on these farms all-risk crop insurance (BASIC); participation would occur generally in the United States. in the loan and crop insurance only (NOTAR);
Results from this study also have broader and participation in only the crop insurance implications for policy analysts. It appears program (NOSUPP).
that farm-level policy simulation studies are Results of the study indicate that increasing sensitive to the assumed level of price varprice variability leads to higher average end-iability. It would be advisable, therefore, for ing net worth and more rapid farm growth analysts to test alternative price distributions in the presence of farm programs that protect when analyzing the possible effects of farm producers from low prices and incomes. Un-program provisions.
